This paper engages with the theme of local ownership in peacebuilding from a practicebased perspective which suggests that the way in which the external actors reach out and work with local constituencies shows conceptual and practice gaps that limit the applicability of local ownership in day-to-day peacebuilding operations. We examine how, in the case of EU peacebuilding policies, such gaps impair the potential for effective, inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding. Using a Whole-of-Society lens the paper demonstrates how current modalities of EU engagement fail to embrace the diversity of local society and its authentic forms of mobilisation and action in order to pursue peacebuilding objectives that resonate with locally relevant forms of peace. The paper further reflects on how Whole-ofSociety perspective can provides pointers for enhancing peacebuilding practices in this area.
Introduction
The norm of local ownership of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction goes to the heart of the moral and practical dilemmas of external interventions in civil conflict. The translation from policy ideal to good practice has been observed as a challenge dogged by conceptual confusion and process issues, that continues to intrigue scholarship and defy effective implementation. While an emphasis on local agency and empowerment is seen as a critical, and often elusive factor in ensuring effective and sustainable peacebuilding by major actors such as the UN and the EU, and has featured strongly in reviews of practice (most recently the UN peacekeeping reviews and the EU global strategy), changes are being pursued predominantly at the strategic level whereas tactical and operational difficulties in implementing local ownership persist. 1 In this paper we start from the assumption that the practice, or problem-solving perspective of local ownership represents the most significant deficit which undermines the normative premise of local ownership that it serves to improve the legitimacy of intervention, ensure the increased involvement and support of local populations, and from this enhance durable outcomes from international peacebuilding policies. Following the observation that practice also lags scholarship on this issue 2 , this paper attempts to reflect the practice implications of the scholarly debate which has problematised the gap between rhetorical commitment and results on the ground, by showing local engagement as essentially a strategy of compliance with externally promoted policy blueprints, and secondly as failure to understand ' the local'. We seek to build on these conceptualisations to suggest that the practice deficit not only needs to address both these elements, but also tailor implementation more closely to the variegated and dynamic nature of local society at the non-state level, seeing these as creative possibilities and capabilities of external peacebuilding and not a limitation and block on its progress. We propose that a thicker 3 form of engagement with local society based on alignments between external policies on the one hand, and non-state Empirically, we show how local actors mobilise to respond to multiple vulnerabilities they experience and decide on priorities, as well as their flexibility and ability to tap into diverse local capacities. Within a framework of Whole-of-Society, we also show how local mobilisations respond to opportunities and constraints that international involvement creates.
The aim is to suggest new avenues for external engagement which are grounded in both actor and process dynamics within local society. We have grouped these avenues of engagement in terms of (actor) inclusivity, leveraging local relationships and synchronizing with practices of local peacebuilding. We suggest that these forms and avenues of engagement constitute latent possibilities of current peacebuilding practice, which can complement and enrich the international-local interaction.
The paper aims to contribute to debates on local ownership by providing a practicebased perspective and by adding to the pool of empirical evidence on the implementation of local ownership at operational level. The analysis draws primarily from empirical data collected during field work in Ukraine in September 2016, which involved a roundtable discussion with local and international practitioners, policy-makers, academic experts and civil society activists, 11 individual semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the business sector, faith groups, civil society, informal groups providing humanitarian aid to occupied territories, think tanks and academic experts in Kiev, and one focus group with civil society organisations. This data is combined with empirical observations from other cases of international interventions in peacebuilding and conflict resolution collected as part of the research project on EU Civilian Capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding and through desk studies.
Local ownership: Conceptual-practical contention and the value-added of a Whole-of-
Society approach
A recurrent theme among scholars of peacebuilding and development during the last 25 years, local ownership has gone through several iterations of conceptual development whose consequences for peacebuilding practice have been ambivalent at best. In the mid-1990s, the main preoccupation was with a problem of noncompliance with externally supported programmes and policies among the intended beneficiaries of peacebuilding efforts. A lack of take-up and affiliation was attributed to a combination of local resistance to externally prescribed programmes and the fact that policies had limited relevance to realities on the ground, as well as to absent capacities on the recipient side. ground was characterised by partial, superficial, often shallow, and ad hoc engagement with a predefined set of local actors. 12 The foremost concern on the interveners' side was how to overcome resistance, and ensure local buy-in for their enterprise by engaging the 'right' local constituencies rather than taking issue directly and systematically with the latter's concerns. 13 This phase of local ownership scholarship was criticised for its focus on external interveners 14 , and as deficient in its account of 'the local' component of peacebuilding, and by extension local ownership. The charge was that inadequate conceptualisation of the local resulted in a lack of ontological relevance of local ownership in practice and intractable problems in translating the conceptualisation of the local into programming concepts. 15 The ensuing scholarship of the so called 'local turn' reconceptualised the local to capture its plural, fluid, dynamic and agential quality-in other words to identify the 'true' local-and proposed to put the local as everyday practice at the centre of peacebuilding practice. 16 Instead of relying on pre-defined prescriptive frameworks and the local as given, from this perspective external interveners and scholars are invited to engage contextually with the local forms of agency and their unexpected capacities. 17 The most notable practice response was a change in the approach to inclusion that extended outreach to 'atypical' local interlocutors including prominently women and youth as well as other traditionally marginalised categories, notably internally displaced population and minority groups. Another practice change was more systematic engagement of civil society organisations in preparations and evaluations of strategic documents evident in the UN, the EU and other major actors engaged in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. This still myopic interpretation of inclusivity in practice echoed a criticism some scholars expressed that the local turn perspective engaged insufficiently with local agency, and that this in turn generated another set of practice problems. 18 As a result, peacebuilding practice continued to be poorly equipped to deliver on the normative promise of local ownership. 19 The source of this enduring difficulty to operationalise local ownership is ultimately a cognitive one. While the first phase of local ownership scholarship highlighted the problems of insufficient agency, local turn scholars go further in viewing agency as not only a premise of locally owned peacebuilding but also a challenge to the international community's liberal peace project. Both phases see local agency in terms of resistance, but on different grounds.
In the early local ownership debates, resistance was about a misfit between the external and local understanding of peace; in the more recent accounts, the emphasis is on 'resistant agency' 20 whereby resistance is imbued with emancipatory potential. This assumption of local agency as either a deficit or a problem to overcome, 21 has been tackled by a more recent process-centred, relational perspective on peacebuilding and local ownership, which foregrounds interactions, processes and practices in the local peacebuilding context. 22 Of particular note is the emphasis on pragmatism which 'directs attention to the everyday practices, strategies and institutions as a basis for addressing concrete problems at hand' 23 and the importance of 'how practices work in a particular context'. 24 In contrast to the rather abstract tenor of much of the scholarship on local ownership, a focus on relations and processes is seen as way to 'reach out into the everyday and pragmatically support local practices in addressing context specific challenges'. 25 The notion of Whole-of-Society (WOS) offers one way of approaching the existing practices and processes of peacebuilding as a starting point to arrive at more constructive, peace inducing relationships among the plethora of actors and agencies in the conflict space.
It is a pragmatic and positivist-in a sense of objective and fact based-take on local agency as enacted through interactions of actors and process in a conflict space. A Whole-of-Society approach suggests that intervention practice can acknowledge and reflect local responses to conflicts not only by attempting to engage with a greater diversity of local stakeholders, but also through identifying combinations of significant non-state actors , taking account of relationships and interactions among local groups, and by recognising the breadth, depth and relevance of indigenous practices. This is to think about not only who constitutes local society, but also how social actors exercise agency both individually, in conjunction with other locals and with internationals. Going further, the explicitly normative aspect of a
Whole-of-Society approach sees the presence of external intervention itself as a creative site of local conflict responses, providing additional dynamism and also glue for interactions at the grass roots, capturing elements of pragmatic engagement which are currently obscured.
The shift in practice implied is to move away from a problematic view of local ownership and the local as something to be overcome and transformed, to recognising the resources inherent in how local actors respond to multiple security needs. It is also about crafting a capability out of recognising and building on the strategies they use to respond to the interconnected nature of vulnerabilities in the conflict space. Working with all these elements of inclusivity, the importance of relationships and the relevance of local practice responses to conflict, WOS seeks to shift policy mechanisms away from a dominant focus on elite bargains, programmatic interventions or capacity and institution building towards supporting and leveraging patterns of actorness and organisation in a local space. 
Inclusivity
A tendency in external peacebuilding to focus on and privilege a relatively narrow group of locals, which can be characterised as government and non-government elites, is also characteristic of EU practices. There are many reasons for this, to do with process and conceptual issues that can lead to marginalisation of constituencies which may be integral to constructing a representative picture of local society and sites of agency, and that are relevant in terms of building social capital of intervention. Sometimes, important constituencies are invisible and bypassed because, as Mac Ginty suggests, the internationals are simply not equipped to see the local; 26 or because of physical and conflict geography of the locality; or because of the rules and regulations international actors follow in engaging with local constituencies such as funding priorities and procedures which delimit target beneficiaries to those who are able to apply for and implement external donor programmes; or excluding certain actors on ethical grounds.
We identified two types of groups in particular, namely private companies and faith groups which are under-acknowledged by external interventions. Yet they are significant in and dynamic forms of interaction between locals and internationals. In this sense, our focus on these two particular groups is illustrative of the gaps and missed opportunities for external peacebuilders to engage both vertically and horizontally with local society.
The private sector
The private sector is on the whole disconnected from mainstream peacebuilding interventions and its contribution is conceived as an indirect one through its role as a driver of economic growth and a provider of jobs. The private sector is however uniquely embedded in local society, with links across multiple societal levels that can be harnessed for peacebuilding goals or equally whose tendency to pursue particularistic interests needs to be addressed to prevent them undermining peace. Statement, which emerged in response to the Maidan citizens' mobilisation. Formally separated into two opposing political camps-one under the formal jurisdiction of the Ukraine government, the other belonging to the separatist government-business on both sides of the divide, share a concern over rising criminality which is a consequence of disruption to the legal economy. Rising criminality which deforms Ukraine's economic and social fabric as 
Faith groups
Among scholars and peacebuilding practitioners religion tends to be framed predominantly in terms of a conflict driver, rather than treating religious groups as a category of socio-political actor with peacebuilding potential. 35 Church in political debates and the behaviour of church officials in disputed territories has contributed to defining the external analysis of those conflicts, whereas the church's ongoing everyday responses to the conflicts are also interesting in revealing its role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. 37 In Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church is an influential socio- economic actor with an economic portfolio in agriculture, tourism, and construction as well as a provider of education; it also has a stake in over 400 print and electronic media which affords it multiple channels of influence in local society.
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As well as an ambiguous political actor, at another level of action the Russian Orthodox Church has supported the work of volunteer brigades consisting of churchgoers and civil society organisations in providing humanitarian assistance in Eastern Ukraine and psychosocial care for internally displaced people. The brigades also provide practical advice on relocation, employment opportunities and other needs of displaced population. 'Save Ukraine' is a fusion of religious and secular groups that operate a brigade style system in providing humanitarian aid in 24 locations across the borderline between government and separatist territories; they also provide moral and spiritual support to internally displaced and former fighters; it also runs a hot line for any citizens needing advice and help .
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From a Whole-of-Society perspective, besides reaching out to 'hidden' and overlooked actors, the process of inclusion itself is consequential in ensuring more locally relevant peacebuilding by supporting existing capabilities and resources. Gaining ground in the development aid community, and much less so among peacebuilding practitioners despite theoretical advances pointing in that direction, is an approach of 'locally-led' initiatives intended to tap into latent local capabilities. 40 By way of illustration, in Kenya the Danish government development agency supported a combination of religious-based and development organisations, some of which were informal groups of volunteers, to work on conflict resolution and terrorism prevention so that they were able to define the priorities and actors including armed youth, religious preachers and terror suspects whose participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is fundamentally important and yet sidelined in official peacebuilding and conflict prevention practices of the EU and most key international players. 41 Here the different qualities of faith-groups, in particular their moral and spiritual authority in some contexts, that allow them to mobilise for peace often the most unlikely of social groups, are important and yet underutilised aspect of local agency.
A relational perspective
For peacebuilding practice, one of the most pertinent issues around local ownership is identifying 'the right' interlocutors within a host society who could take on board peacebuilding, and preventing the 'wrong' type of actors from being empowered. In Ukraine, the ability of the European Business Association to draw on support from diaspora, is an example of how a diverse geography of peacebuilding and diverse relationships are being mobilised and deployed to create new sites of activism and authority.
In responding to conflict developments on the ground, the Association has expanded its international contacts and collaboration in order to strengthen its standing with the government and establish its credibility as a peacebuilding actor. The Association has taken advantage of the EU presence to secure EU backing to increase its own international profile. This emboldened status is seen as a step towards the Association eventually getting a seat at the table to formally participate in the dialogue with the government over the future peace settlement. 43 Simultaneously, at a different level of interaction, companies in Ukraine, some of which are the members of the Association-particularly in Kiev which has a large internally displaced population-have been actively involved in tri-partite relations with the government, civil society organisations and volunteer groups in supporting aforementioned work placement schemes for the internally displaced population. 44 relationships reflects the ability of faith groups to mobilise for peace beyond their own communities, and to work both in concert with as well as in parallel to other faith and secular groups, locally and transnationally, that remains insufficiently integrated with other peacebuilding efforts.
Complementary practices
Plural constituencies in the conflict space reflect not only different geographies and experiences but imply a diversity of attitudes to the conflict, different expectations regarding outcomes and anticipated results of external intervention. As a result, there are multiple opportunities for conflict responses, and a range of peacebuilding activities both independent of and in conjunction with external actors which reflect local understanding of problems and community needs.
The issue of sequencing of civilian peacebuilding has been identified as a key policy and practice challenge to local ownership. 50 Locally organised groups of activists, whatever their motivation (for example religious or business), are particularly effective in providing bridging activities between humanitarian assistance at the sharp end of active conflict and underlying reforms to embed peace as well as between medium and longer-term assistance.
The ability of small local actors to implement transitional activities is illustrated by the case of 'Save Ukraine' group. Mobilised initially around humanitarian and emergency assistance, the group has established its credibility through access to constituencies with extreme human security needs through timely and local intervention. Subsequent activities and services were adapted through a proximate knowledge of next steps required which included for example livelihood strategies for the conflict-affected population that led to 'Save Ukraine' developing a programme to assist individuals with setting up bakery businesses . 51 This is an example of pragmatic sequencing of interventions, which illustrates how coordination of different actors and activities takes place on the ground as the peacebuilding process unfolds in contrast to pre-existing protocols and frameworks drawn by the interveners. and strategic priorities of these groups tend to have a short life-cycle, and this limits their possibilities to secure financial backing from large donors which cater to more established civil society organisations with capacity to administer large grants over longer period of time.
Yet these groups are better able to adapt to the rapid evolution of events on the ground and changing priorities, and develop small and short-term but nevertheless often vital projects which target specific groups; for example older women , disabled former combatants or those 
